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The Benefits of Bridging Social Psychology and
Economics, by Paul A. M. Van Lange, Free
University, Amsterdam, and Leiden University,
The Netherlands
Some people have suggested that revolutions
tend to start right after the turn of a century or
some other relatively arbitrary “landmark.” Af-
ter decades of specialization in most scientific
disciplines, with an ever-increasing differentia-
tion in subdisciplines, each having its own jour-
nals, associations, and research centers, there is
now a rapidly growing development toward
linking fields and disciplines in important ways.
This development has “revolutionary” aspects,
because this is the first time that we have wit-
nessed such strong tendencies toward interdis-
ciplinarity (after a long period of specialization)
and because it may impact the scientific land-
scape in important ways.
Revolutionary or not, Social Psychology and
Economics is a reflection of a strong tendency to
link fields of research coming from two or more
different disciplines, and perhaps of a potential
change in the scientific landscape. Only in the
past decade have numerous books been pub-
lished that take interdisciplinary approaches
(e.g., Taylor, 2002), as well as quite a few jour-
nals devoting special issues to issues of inter-
disciplinarity (e.g., Brewer, Kenney, & Norem,
2000), and there has been an increasing number
of interdisciplinary associations, journals, con-
ferences, and research centers. Also, in a recent
volume entitled Bridging Social Psychology
(Van Lange, 2006), more than a hundred authors
from different disciplines and nations discuss
ideas and research relevant to four grand
bridges of social psychology, including (1)
bridges with biology, neuroscience, and cogni-
tive sciences; (2) bridges with personality, emo-
tion, and development; (3) bridges with relation-
ship science, interaction, and health; and (4)
bridges with organizational science, culture,
and economics.
Indeed, as the editors of Social Psychology
and Economics note in the preface, “The time
is particularly right for a book like this one” (p.
xi). The volume represents areas of research
that traditionally have been part of economics
and social psychology, such as judgment and
decision making, cooperation and competi-
tion, and negotiation and coordination. But
there are also some “newer” areas of research
now being captured by both disciplines. For
example, the recurrence of an interest in emo-
tion, as a key process in understanding social
decision making, is very important and char-
acterizes trends in both disciplines (see chap-
ters by Timothy Ketelaar and by Marcel
Zeelenberg and Rik Pieters). The importance of
institutions is often overlooked in contempo-
rary (social) psychology, especially when one
realizes that “people often think, feel, and act
as society members” (p. 344; see also Bar-Tal,
2006), and because outside our labs are the
institutions that define the “rules of the game”
(Iris Bohnet, p. 213). Conversely, topics such as
value from fit (Tory Higgins) or empathy as
determinant of altruism (Daniel Batson) may
be fruitfully imported by economics since
these psychological forces are powerful deter-
minants of decision making in many economic
contexts. Thus, the volume does a truly excel-
lent job of bringing together diverse lines of
research that either have always been part of
both economics and social psychology or
should become a stronger part of both disci-
plines.
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BENEFITS OF BRIDGING SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS
Concepts such as “working together” and “co-
operation” have connotations that sound very
good. Yet cooperation and interdisciplinary ef-
forts are not going to last if the benefits do not
exceed the costs—above and beyond semantics
and connotation. Various chapters in this vol-
ume provide nice illustrations of some benefits
(and some potential obstacles) of bridging so-
cial psychology and economics. I discuss these
benefits with the help of four benefits of bridg-
ing social psychology with other fields or disci-
plines discussed in Van Lange (2006).
A first benefit is thatmajor scientific problems
call for bridging. Some questions seem as basic
and as “old” as science itself, but they are still
unresolved. One such question centers on the
mind-body problem, focusing on such issues as
the existence and functions of conscience and
“free will” in relation to the brain and behavior.
For example, in what way can the body control
the mind in such a manner that “we lose our
minds” (i.e., we cannot control our thoughts and
feelings)? The questions of self-regulation and
self-control—when and how people fail to do
what they want even when they have the knowl-
edge, skill, and opportunity—are clearly rele-
vant to the mind-body problem and the issue of
free will (see the chapter by Kentaro Fujita, Yaa-
cov Trope, and Nira Liberman). Another basic
question addresses “human nature,” and I found
the chapters by David Messick, which empha-
sizes the importance of competition (and social
comparison), and Daniel Batson, which empha-
sizes the importance of empathy and altruism,
very important to understanding the strong vio-
lations of the assumption of “rational self-
interest.”
A second benefit is that major scientific theo-
ries call for bridging. The editors note that “so-
cial psychology does not train its researchers
well in constructing theories, which is one of
economics greatest strengths” (p. 7). I am not
sure whether this is true, because writing arti-
cles in major social psychological journals typ-
ically requires considerable theoretical skills.
Also, several social psychological theories (e.g.,
the theory of cognitive dissonance) are well-
appreciated outside of social psychology (see
also Rachel Croson, p. 314). In my view, the prob-
lem is that social psychology focuses on “mini-
theories” to account for interesting phenomena,
rather than on “grand theories” that seek to ex-
plain most or all of human social behavior (e.g.,
Kelley, 2000; Pinker, 2002; Van Lange, 2006). In-
deed, I find myself in perfect agreement with the
thoughtful discussion advanced by Rachel Cro-
son, who suggests that psychological theories
tend to score high on accuracy but low on par-
simony, whereas theories in economics tend to
score high on parsimony and low on accuracy
(pp. 304–305). It is interesting to see that, at
present, evolutionary theory has been adopted
by many economists and social psychologists to
account for social behavior. My impression is
that economists have welcomed this grand the-
ory more strongly than social psychologists, per-
haps because of differences in concern with par-
simony and accuracy.
A third benefit is that major scientific prob-
lems and theories call for methods that call for
bridging. There is an increasing consensus that
the social and behavioral sciences benefit from
great variety in measurement techniques and
methods. In particular, in the last decade alone,
we have witnessed increasing use of methods
derived from the biological, cognitive, and neu-
rosciences, such as variations in blood pressure,
sophisticated priming techniques, and fMRI
(functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) tech-
niques. For example, the fields of social neuro-
science and neuroeconomics reveal that many
basic questions addressing such topics as trust,
exchange, and coordination can now be ad-
dressed by using fMRI techniques and comple-
mentary physiological techniques, as discussed
by Kevin McCabe in this volume (see also Ca-
cioppo et al., 2002). Another key finding is that
the act of punishing others who abuse trust is
associated with an area of the brain (i.e., dorsal
striatum) that has been demonstrated to be in-
volved in the processing of rewards that follow
from goal-directed actions; this finding suggests
that people derive satisfaction from punishing
norm violators (De Quervain et al., 2004).
It is also interesting to see that by nature of
the fact that fMRI requires repeated observa-
tions, the experimental game paradigm (which
is so popular in behavioral economics) is very
well-suited for such neuroscientific research. It
is important to note as well that alternative
measures—examining neurochemical pro-
cesses, attention (via eye tracking), or subtle
influences not requiring attention (e.g., priming
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techniques), to name just a few—are very impor-
tant for testing the role of emotions, self-control,
and cognition in social decision making. Such
techniques may also be very helpful in replac-
ing some traditional models of rational self-
interest, as discussed in various chapters (e.g.,
Linda Babcock, Michele Gelfand, Deborah
Small, and Heidi Stayn; Carsten De Dreu and
Wolfgang Steinel; Eric van Dijk and David De
Cremer; and Tom Tyler and David De Cremer),
with ones that do more justice to social consid-
erations and to bounded rationality.
Finally, a fourth benefit is that societal prob-
lems call for bridging. For most if not all perva-
sive societal problems, it takes the knowledge,
skill, and expertise from more than one disci-
pline to really understand the problem and
make a contribution to resolving it. Consider, for
example, the threats to the health and vitality of
our environment. The massive use of scarce nat-
ural resources (e.g., catching too many fish for
nature to replenish) and the pollution of the en-
vironment (e.g., dumping industrial waste) cre-
ate large-scale and, to some degree, irreversible
societal problems. Such complex problems call
for the input of various fields and disciplines to
effectively understand the magnitude of the
problem (e.g., biologists and geologists should
inform us about the state of affairs regarding
environmental solution), while other disciplines
may inform us about the boundary conditions
for bringing about effective change in behavior
and habits in individuals, groups, and social
institutes (e.g., psychologists, economists, polit-
ical scientists, and policy makers).
Relevant to theory and society, the chapter by
Max Bazerman and Deepak Malhotra does an
excellent job of discussing some persistent
“myths.” It is likely that some of these incorrect
or incomplete views (e.g., the myth that people
know their preferences and pursue known pref-
erences with volition) will be replaced by the
truth when economics and psychology inform
each other in more effective ways so that, ulti-
mately, the government should be better able to
design policy and implement measures. The no-
tion that economists have stronger ties than psy-
chologists with governmental policy is interest-
ing. One parsimonious explanation is that
governments are more strongly interested in
“economics” than the “psychology of people” be-
cause governments may often follow the im-
plicit assumption that “economics drive people.”
Although this parsimonious assumption does
not excel in accuracy, it is the kind of belief that
governments tend to work with, perhaps in part
because the assumption of rational self-interest
is one of the strongest myths. Another reason is
that the majority of psychologists do not directly
speak to large-scale, societal issues, since the
discipline primarily focuses on the individual as
the unit of analysis.
OBSTACLES OF BRIDGING SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS
Some obstacles are rooted in differences in
norms and guidelines, such as the use of decep-
tion in research, the necessity of using money to
study “outcomes,” or the ideal shape of an em-
pirical article. Articles written by economists
and social psychologists tend to vary in terms of
length of the introduction, number of references,
and so on. However, these differences, some of
which are nicely illustrated by Keith Murnighan
and Alvin Roth, should not make bridging too
difficult. Other obstacles may be more challeng-
ing, because they touch on strongly felt theoret-
ical assumptions. For example, as noted by
Rachel Croson, economists are strongly at-
tached to outcomes, whereas social psycholo-
gists are strongly attached to processes. Per-
haps this follows from long-standing differences
in how to come to grips with the dilemma of
parsimony versus accuracy in theorizing, re-
search design, and methods. Such differences
also exist within a discipline, of course, but the
between-discipline variance still seems over-
whelming.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The theoretical, methodological, and societal
benefits of bridging social psychology and eco-
nomics are convincing, especially for the re-
search areas discussed in Social Psychology
and Economics. So what are the challenges? I
speculate that the key difference that econo-
mists favor parsimony over accuracy and social
psychologists favor accuracy over parsimony is
going to be the most fundamental challenge for
the builders of bridges between social psychol-
ogy and economics. At the same time, I believe
that, in the long run, the science focusing on
social decision making, interdependence, coop-
eration, and competition (the areas I know best)
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is strongly served by research coming from both
research traditions. More than anything else, a
joint venture of parsimony and accuracy seems
the most fruitful route to building “grand theo-
ries” that are simple yet comprehensive, con-
cerned with outcome and process, with passion
and reason, and with automaticity and deliber-
ation, all of which seem to characterize “social
animals and economic beings.”
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The Dialogue Between Psychology and
Economics: Obstacles and Opportunities, by
George Wu, University of Chicago
The interaction between psychology and eco-
nomics over the years has been far from
straightforward. The two fields were perhaps
most removed during the ordinal utility revolu-
tion in the early twentieth century, when eco-
nomics banished considerations of intensity of
preference, such as marginal utility. Lewin, in
an historical account of psychology and eco-
nomics, wrote of the dominant view of main-
stream economists during this movement: “Eco-
nomics was independent of psychological
assumptions; it spoke only about behavior,
which could always be rationalized by some
preferences, whatever the actual psychological
cause” (1996: 1294). The distance between the
two disciplines has closed considerably in the
last fifty years, as measured in part by the nu-
merous conferences designed to get economists
and psychologists to interact. These conferences
have produced a number of interesting edited
volumes (e.g., Brocas & Carillo, 2003, 2004; Ho-
garth & Reder, 1986; Loewenstein & Elster, 1992;
Thrall, Coombs, & Davis, 1954). To this list, I add
a new and exciting collection, Social Psychology
and Economics.
It is instructive to view this book from an his-
torical lens and understand what it says about
the present and future interaction between
economists and psychologists. To do so, I will
juxtapose Social Psychology and Economics
with Hogarth and Reder (1986), a collection of
papers from a conference that brought together
cognitive psychologists and economists. (To put
my comments in perspective, I am a behavioral
decision researcher with publications in both
psychology and economics. Although I am not a
card-carrying member of either community, I am
provided with visitor passes on a regular basis.)
The Hogarth and Reder collection was precipi-
tated by work in cognitive psychology—in par-
ticular, pioneering work by Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky on judgment under uncer-
tainty and decision under risk. Kahneman and
Tversky showed that individuals make probabi-
listic judgments that are sometimes inconsistent
with the basic laws of probability theory. They
also demonstrated that people make risky
choices that are not always in accord with ex-
pected utility maximization. These empirical
findings struck economic theory at its core, since
classical economic theory is built on the as-
sumption that economic agents are rational—
namely, Bayesian expected utility maximizers.
The impact of this work on economics (and the
social sciences more broadly) was recognized
when Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel
Prize in Economic Science in 2002.
The Hogarth and Reder collection was curi-
ously titled Rational Choice: The Contrast Be-
tween Economics and Psychology. Hogarth
and Reder, in their preface to the collection,
expanded on the objectives of the conference
and the volume: “to provide a mechanism
whereby both economists and psychologists
could profit from being exposed to different
674 AprilAcademy of Management Review

